Facluty Veterinary Medicine

27-Aug-2016 16:00:00

For (2016-2017)

Southeast Asia has descended into a maritime insecurity spiral since the April–June 2012 stand-off at Scarborough Shoal between Chinese maritime security forces and the Philippine Navy, which motivated Manila to initiate legal arbitration proceedings in The Hague. The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) ruling in favour of the Philippines will be difficult to enforce. To forestall an even more intense security dilemma in the South China Sea, regional policymakers should not lose sight of four vital underlying strategic trends.

First, the power asymmetry and economic interdependence between China and Southeast Asia will continue to grow. While this does not mean that China’s smaller neighbours should give up their territorial and resource claims, they do necessarily have to sustain relationships with China that are wider than just the South China Sea disputes alone.

Second, the United States is no longer the only great power operating in maritime Southeast Asia. As China’s military capability and economic interests expand it wants to secure access to the region’s sea lanes, territories and economic zones. This obliges both Washington and Beijing to find mutually acceptable rules for maritime usage, if only because neither wants to go to war over rocks and islands per se.

Third, China is most likely to continue on its path of national development within the existing international order — because it has benefited enormously from it, and its key economic partners sit within it. Ultimately, because China’s successful domestic economic transformation could be undermined by regional instability, we may expect the Chinese leadership to temper the excesses of its territorial claims.

For a rising power like China the downside of accepting the existing order is having to give less powerful states more regard than their capabilities alone deserve, such as by respecting unfavourable international legal rulings. Yet the upsides are significant because many existing international rules also favour the more powerful. For example, as China develops more long-range naval capabilities, its leaders and military too will appreciate the right to ‘innocent passage’ in others’ territorial waters and to military activities in their exclusive economic zones, which they currently oppose for the United States.

Fourth, the most dangerous element of the South China Sea disputes is not island-building, territorial claims or freedom of navigation, but rather intense competition over rapidly declining fishery resources. Armed disputes over fishing grounds have long been fairly common in the area but these are now exacerbated by large-scale commercial fishing. Growing involvement of coast guards and other national maritime security agencies threatens to turn such fishing disputes into bigger regional conflicts.

Where does this leave Southeast Asia after the PCA ruling?

The Philippines (and other claimants) have secured important moral high ground in the disputes. But the judgment by itself will also not wipe clean the South China Sea slate; the region will still face the same knotty problem of seemingly irreconcilable territorial and resource claims.

All parties should seize the opportunity offered by this legal juncture to regroup and refocus on the wider strategic picture. Effective management of these disputes will require maintenance of relationships with China, resolve and restraint.

Focusing on Southeast Asian states’ relationships with China means acknowledging and upholding the PCA ruling, while resisting the temptation to beat China over the head with it. More urgently, Southeast Asia needs to work with the United States and other partners — including Japan, India and Australia — to convince Chinese leaders about the value of stabilising China’s relationship with the region.